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A B S T R A C T
The emergence of the Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Corona Virus (MERS-CoV) in the Middle East in 2012
was associated with an overwhelming uncertainty about its epidemiological and clinical characteristics. Once
dromedary camels (Camelus dromedarius) was found to be the natural reservoir of the virus, the public health
systems across the Arabian Peninsula encountered an unprecedented pressure to control its transmission. This
view point describes how the One Health approach was used in Qatar to manage the MERS-CoV outbreak during
the period 2012–2017.
One Health focuses on the association between the human, animals and environment sectors for total health
and wellbeing of these three sectors. To manage the MERS outbreak in Qatar through a One Health approach, the
Qatar National Outbreak Control Taskforce (OCT) was reactivated in November 2012. The animal health sector
was invited to join the OCT. Later on, technical expertise was requested from the WHO, FAO, CDC, EMC, and
PHE. Subsequently, a comprehensive One Health roadmap was delivered through leadership and coordination;
surveillance and investigation; epidemiological studies and increase of local diagnostic capacity.
The joint OCT, once trained had easy access to allocated resources and high risk areas to provide more
evidence on the potential source of the virus and to investigate all reported cases within 24–48 h. Lack of
suﬃcient technical guidance on veterinary surveillance and poor risk perception among the vulnerable popu-
lation constituted major obstacles to maintain systematic One Health performance.
1. The problem
The emergence of the Middle East Respiratory Syndrome
Coronavirus (MERS-CoV) in the Middle East in 2012 [1] has remained a
public health concern particularly in the Arabian Peninsula till the
present time. Dromedary camels (Camelus dromedarius) have been
found to be the natural reservoir from which the viral spill-over to
humans can occur. Camels show no or minor clinical signs if infected
with MERS-CoV [2]. As of the end of February 2019, 2374 laboratory
conﬁrmed human cases worldwide, including 823 associated deaths
(case-fatality rate: 34.6%), have been reported. The majority of these
cases were reported from Saudi Arabia (1983 cases, including 745 re-
lated deaths) [3]. In Qatar, a total of 24 human cases have been re-
ported along with 8 related deaths. At the beginning of the MERS
outbreak in 2012, the lack of knowledge, particularly on the mode and
speed of transmission of this novel virus, challenged the healthcare
systems in Qatar as well as the entire Gulf region, amid fears that
transmission could readily happen between humans. The unfamiliarity
of the responding agencies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) with
such an extraordinary threat heightened the concerns of the aﬀected
communities in Qatar as MERS cases continued to be reported from all
neighbouring GCC countries. Moreover, the GCC countries are
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characterised with intensive movement of people and camels across the
borders.
An eager race was started to establish the epidemiology of the dis-
ease. The epidemiological link of MERS-CoV with camels was revealed
in October 2013. Two patients had frequent contact with animals, in-
cluding camels, and had no history of travel outside Qatar in the two
weeks before they became ill. MERS-CoV was detected from nasal
swabs of three camels with which the patients had contact [4]. A huge
pressure was placed on the Qatar National Outbreak Control Task Force
(OCT) to ﬁnd answers for the novel disease to control the outbreak and
inform the public. During the early phase of the MERS-CoV epidemic,
the OCT had to decide from where to start and which methods to
follow.
The One Health approach focuses on the association and inter-
connection between three sectors: human, animal and environmental
health, and recognizes the total health and wellbeing of these three
sectors [5]. One health is deﬁned as “A collaborative, multisectoral, and
transdisciplinary approach - working at the local, regional, national,
and global levels - with the goal of achieving optimal health outcomes
recognizing the interconnection between people, animals, plants, and
their shared environment” [6]. This view point describes how the One
Health approach was used in surveillance and response to MERS-CoV in
Qatar during the period 2012 to 2017. It could be useful to similar
authorities to inform their preparedness plans for the next potential
emerging zoonotic epidemic in light of the strengths and challenges
experienced by Qatar.
2. Action taken
The OCT was reactivated in Qatar in November 2012 following the
detection of the second MERS-CoV case (sixth worldwide) in the
country. The OCT was established before as a requirement of the
International Health Regulation (IHR) (2005). It is a joint outbreak
investigation team composed of public and animal health experts lead
by the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) in Qatar, applying the One
Health approach and dealing with zoonotic infections. The OCT played
a fundamental role in the national response to the Severe Acute
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and Inﬂuenza (H1N1) virus pandemic in
2009. The new OCT involved multidisciplinary and multisectoral re-
presentation primarily from the MoPH and the Ministry of Municipality
and Environment (MME) in Qatar. To develop a coherent investigation
and response strategy, the MoPH leaders decided to support the OCT
with technical expertise from the World Health Organization (WHO),
the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the
Centres for Disease Control and Prevention of the United States (CDC),
Public Health England (PHE), and Erasmus Medical Centre (EMC) in the
Netherlands.
Experts from these institutions engaged the OCT in an extensive risk
assessment of the MERS outbreak situation. A comprehensive road map
was developed to provide guidance on surveillance, investigation and
response, using a joint One Health approach. This road map included:
(1) Coordination and joint leadership, (2) Joint surveillance and ﬁeld
investigation, (3) Epidemiological studies, and (4) Increase of local
diagnostic capacity.
2.1. Coordination and joint leadership
The road map emphasized the fostering of a conjoined leadership in
terms of planning and decision making. An improved level of co-
ordination was witnessed thereafter between authorities across a
number of areas; sharing of information turned into timely practice, the
process for decision making and approval of plans became quicker,
access to allocated resources and high risk areas (e.g., slaughter house,
animal holdings, camel racing areas, hospitals etc.) became easier, and
communicating the risk to the public reﬂected one voice for joint au-
thorities.
2.2. Joint surveillance and ﬁeld investigation
A joint Rapid Response Team (RRT) was assigned from the MoPH
and the MME to carry out ﬁeld investigation after being subjected to
refresher training on skills and principles of outbreak investigation. To
initiate One Health surveillance it was agreed to build the RRT on the
already functioning Severe Acute Respiratory Infections (SARI) sur-
veillance team in the Public Health Department. The SARI team routi-
nely searches for SARS and Inﬂuenza virus among suspected cases ad-
mitted to hospitals with respiratory symptoms. Importantly, the
community was also engaged in this form of surveillance as family
members, friends and co-workers of the suspected cases were educated
about MERS symptoms and how to report them.
The ability to access and investigate all of the 24 reported cases
within 24–48 h of reporting was one of several fruits of the One Health
surveillance, permitting to yield further epidemiological evidence on
the potential role camels play in the virus transmission. Whenever a
human case was suspected with MERS infection, a patient investigation
was conducted, which included contact tracing, work and movement of
the patient and history of camel contact. If the patient had direct or
indirect camel contact, the RRT informed their veterinary counterpart.
The veterinary team tested the camels around the patient. The public
health team tested all human contacts around the patient. Later on, a
complete report of that patient was prepared. Based on these reports, a
complete One Health approach was developed and implemented. At
least 3 MERS cases were detected during routine case investigations and
contact tracing at the community settings.
2.3. Epidemiological studies
The One Health road map recommended to start with a case-control
study and seroepidemiological surveys targeting at-risk populations
including humans and camels besides testing the stored human re-
spiratory samples retrospectively to determine whether the virus was
totally novel to Qatar population. The outcome of joining forces in
carrying out these studies was outstanding. First and foremost it helped
facilitate the access of the joint RRT to the camel barns and the farms
hosting race camels. Collection of samples and data of camels and their
caregivers became easier, allowing a series of subsequent fundamental
epidemiological, veterinary and clinical studies to take place.
Through these studies it was possible to provide the ﬁrst global
molecular evidence that camels are a potential source for MERS-CoV
[4]. The door was opened to a number of research studies that ensued
thereafter to yield insights into some essential aspects of MERS-CoV.
While some studies focused on exposure to camels and the husbandry
practices, others addressed the mode of transmission to humans, and
possible risk factors [4,7–14]. These ﬁndings have been used to provide
further guidance for studies and prevention measures in Qatar and
other aﬀected countries.
2.4. Increase the local diagnostic capacity
During the early days of the outbreak, the Inﬂuenza laboratory in
the National Inﬂuenza Centre of Hamad Medical Corporation, Qatar
was the primary destination to examine MERS-CoV samples. As the
epidemic evolved and the OCT reactivated, the workload to diagnose
human or camel specimens gradually increased. Joint training activities
for both human and animal labs were organized on lab detection of
MERS-CoV. MERS-CoV sample storage and the test capacity in both
human and veterinary laboratories were scaled up. A network including
international reference laboratories was initiated and this alliance is
maintained to date to tackle other zoonotic diseases like Inﬂuenza,
Rabies etc. To improve coordination and communication, a focal person
was assigned from human and veterinary laboratories to ensure timely
data and sample sharing.
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3. Facilitators and barriers
The commitment of the MoPH and MME in Qatar to the One Health
approach that governed the response to MERS-CoV was largely due to
the previous experiences with SARS and H1N1 pandemic as these ex-
periences helped to show the feasibility and advantages of joint eﬀorts
to policy-makers. The joint strategic technical collaboration between
the Qatari authorities and the international technical bodies such as the
WHO, FAO, CDC, PHE and EMC have greatly facilitated the preparation
and implementation of the road map. Community engagement was
another key factor that improved the investigation of suspected cases.
Yet, these achievements were not without obstacles. As camels in-
fected with MERS only show asymptomatic or mild respiratory tract
disease, camel owners and workers doubted the link between camels
and the disease. Moreover, the veterinarians showed insuﬃcient in-
terest in mounting a large scale outbreak operation similar to the one
initiated by the public health sector, as they have a shortage of tech-
nical guidance on surveillance and other technical areas including la-
boratory tools and diagnostic kits. The One Health approach needed
more local and international support to ensure a systematic and sus-
tained implementation. Furthermore, one study on risk perception
suggested that some camel owners have poor risk perception of MERS
[15]. Additionally, both public health and veterinary sectors were ac-
customed to work in a solo vertical way and only occasionally engaged
with each other in short term research projects. Apart from the SARS
and H1N1 epidemics, the two sectors worked independently, making
joint technical work a diﬃcult task. Therefore, the livestock sector did
not appear to feel the same pressure as the public health sector. How-
ever, further studies are required to explore areas for improvement to
ultimately make the One Health approach more appealing to all sectors
involved.
4. Lessons learnt from the ﬁeld
The One Health approach, despite lacking the appropriate technical
guidance, was already functional and helped address some zoonotic
diseases including Inﬂuenza and Brucella. Although capabilities and
funding were unequal between the public health and the veterinary
sector, the available competencies, supported with a substantial poli-
tical will to join eﬀorts and improve coordination, were suﬃcient to
jointly address MERS-CoV. The adopted inter-sectorial collaboration for
surveillance has been vital to obtain a better understanding of MERS-
CoV in Qatar. Obtaining the reliable evidence about transmission be-
tween camels and humans could have never been achieved without the
prompt and timely joint investigation. Building local One Health
technical capacity to investigate and conﬁrm MERS-CoV in humans and
animals helped the early detection of cases in humans and animals.
Such practices minimized the time and costs for public health control
measures.
Community engagement has been key to establishing One Health
surveillance in Qatar. Self-reporting of disease compared with the
previous rejection and denial was an important change of behaviour
among the people at risk, particularly those exposed to abattoir, camel
race areas and the ports of entry. Furthermore, the positive community
response to the MERS-CoV outbreak control policy was due to the
constant transparent emergency risk communication which allowed the
community to be well-informed of the situation. It also helped to
maintain public trust in the competency of national authorities.
The One Health approach has been essential for generating evidence
and implementing control measures to restrain MERS-CoV and other
zoonotic diseases. The same approach needs to be maintained to assess
the eﬀectiveness of the control measures. As emerging zoonotic viruses
continue to be a challenge, One Health surveillance must be adopted
and fostered at all levels [5].
Finally, as the human MERS-cases seemed to uniquely emerge from
the Arabian Peninsula, regional collaboration in sharing clinical and
surveillance data besides the results of scientiﬁc research is indis-
pensable to ﬁnding answers to the remaining gaps in our knowledge
about the disease. The unexpected disruption of the GCC countries
undoubtedly hindered an eﬀective regional collaboration in sharing
data and carrying out sequencing studies. International agencies are
required to call upon them to consider the One Health approach
building on the Qatar experience which displayed a practical way of
sharing resources and avoiding obstacles to work in the Arabian com-
munity. Establishing a regional committee for coordination and emer-
gency risk communication is an important element to build capacities
required for zoonosis control. We suggest that a regional ‘One Health
Centre of Excellence (OCE)’ would help to develop uniﬁed standards
and integrative guidelines for control of zoonoses including MERS-CoV.
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